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1God and the External World1
Martin Smith
University of Glasgow
There are a number of apparent parallels between belief in God and belief in the existence of an
external world beyond our experiences. Both beliefs would seem to condition one’s overall view
of reality and one’s place within it – and yet it is difficult to see how either can be defended.
Neither belief is likely to receive a purely a priori defence and any empirical evidence that one
cites either in favour of the existence of God or the existence of the external world would seem to
blatantly beg the question against a doubter. I will examine just how far this parallel can be
pushed by examining some strategies for resisting external world scepticism.
I. TWO SCEPTICAL ARGUMENTS
It was once commonly thought, in the philosophy of religion, that belief in the
existence of God could be given a water-tight a priori defence. Few, now, think that
this ambition can be realised. And, if ordinary theists are asked to defend their belief
in God, they may well produce something recognisably empirical in nature. They
may say things like ‘I have felt the presence of God’, ‘God has spoken to me’ or some
such. They might also, of course, cite religious authority or some kind of argument
from design – but I shall focus here upon the former ‘divine revelation’ type
responses. In a way, these serve as paradigm instances of an empirical defence of a
belief. The theist after all is drawing attention to (unusual, moving) experiences that
he has had – experiences that he interprets as providing direct evidence for his belief
in God. Interestingly, this consideration runs counter to the idea that religious belief
is largely a matter of faith – at least if faith be construed as a willingness to believe
without evidence2. Many ordinary religious believers would take themselves to have
evidence for their convictions.
1 This paper was presented in March 2009 as part of a public lecture series at the Centre for Philosophy
and Religion at the University of Glasgow. Thanks to all of those who participated on this occasion.
2 Of course, ‘faith’ can also be used in an epistemically neutral sense to indicate a particularly strong or
heartfelt conviction. In this sense religious beliefs are very often matters of faith.
2An atheist or religious sceptic, however, would likely remain unpersuaded by
an appeal to religious experience – and quite rightly so. The atheist can grant that the
theist has had the unusual and moving experiences that he is drawing attention to –
but will simply deny that they provide any evidence whatsoever for the existence of
God. The atheist will regard these experiences as perfectly explicable without the
need for extravagant supernatural agency – they will be the product of wish fulfilment
or insecurity or delusion or similarly mundane, Earthly factors. The considerations
that the theist cites seem to beg the question against the atheist – one would not regard
these experiences as the result of God’s agency unless one already believed in the
existence of God. We are tempted to reason as follows: If a belief in the existence of
God is based solely upon question-begging grounds, then it is not based upon genuine
evidence, in which case it is unjustified. I strongly suspect that empirical defences of
religious belief based upon religious authority or design arguments will be question-
begging in essentially the same way, but I won’t pursue this here.
Some philosophers have attempted to press a certain comparison between
scepticism about the existence of God and more radical kinds of scepticism – such as
scepticism about the existence of the external world. One of the first to pursue this
line was John Henry Newman in his Sermons on Religious Belief and his Essay in Aid
of a Grammar of Assent3. What Newman argues, very roughly, is that many of the
reasons people offer in favour of religious scepticism have a tendency to
overgeneralise and land us with a scepticism that is far more widespread. The
comparison between religious and anti-sceptical convictions is also associated with
some of Wittgenstein’s epistemological musings in On Certainty4 – something I will
return to.
At first blush, the parallels really do seem striking. It was also widely thought,
once upon a time, that a belief in the existence of the external world might receive a
3 For discussion of John Henry Newman’s views on religious epistemology see Kenny (1992, essay 7).
4 Wittgenstein makes no overt remarks about religious belief in On Certainty. But some have taken
inspiration from Wittgenstein’s notion of a ‘hinge proposition’ (see remarks 83, 144, 152, 341-344, 558)
arguing that a belief in the existence of God, like a belief in the existence of the external world, plays a
very different role to familiar everyday beliefs – and, thus, may be exempt from familiar kinds of
epistemic evaluation (for discussion see Nielsen, 1967, Phillips, 1993, Pritchard, 2000). There are
some suggestions of this kind of view in Wittgenstein’s lectures on religious belief (see Wittgenstein,
1966). I will have more to say about this in the next section.
3purely a priori defence. Few now think that this is possible. And if ordinary people
are asked to defend their belief in the external world, more often than not they will
produce something empirical – ‘Just look around you!’ or ‘Here’s a chair, here’s a
table’. One might attempt to offer an inference to the best explanation (a rough
analogue of an argument from design) – but I shall focus here upon the more knee-
jerk ‘Moorean’ type defences. These, in effect, serve as paradigm empirical defences
of one’s belief. One is after all drawing attention to (mundane) experiences that one
has had – experiences that one interprets as providing direct evidence for one’s belief
in an external world. This, again, runs counter to an idea that is occasionally
expressed in epistemology – namely, that belief in an external world is essentially a
matter of faith.
But now imagine a hypothetical sceptic – a person who genuinely believes that
there is no external world. In his view, there are no such things as tables, trees, atoms
etc. – all of reality is mind dependent in some relevant sense. (Strictly speaking, this
character might be better described as an ‘idealist’ of some sort, since he actively
denies the existence of the external world rather than merely suspending judgment. I
shall stick with the term ‘sceptic’, though – largely to avoid misleading comparisons
with subjective or absolute idealism). Such a sceptic would likely remain unmoved
by an appeal to perceptual experience – and, it seems, quite rightly so. The sceptic
will grant that one has had all kinds of ordinary perceptual experiences – but will
simply deny that these experiences provide any evidence for the existence of an
external world. For the sceptic, it would be a serious mistake to regard these
experiences as caused by extravagant mind-transcendent objects and states of affairs –
they will be explicable rather as a kind of spontaneous expression of the mind (one
can fill in the details as one likes). The considerations that one cites seem to beg the
question against the sceptic – one would not regard these experiences as caused by
external states of affairs unless one already believed in the existence of the external
world. We are tempted to infer as follows: If a belief in the existence of the external
world is based solely upon question-begging grounds, then it is not based upon
genuine evidence, in which case it is unjustified. I strongly suspect that defences
based upon inference to the best explanation will be question-begging in exactly the
same way, but I won’t pursue this here.
4Our first conclusion – that belief in the existence of God is unjustified – would
doubtless suit an atheist. But this second conclusion – that belief in the existence of
the external world is unjustified – would not suit anyone much. If I am not justified in
believing in the existence of the external world, then I plausibly lack justification for
believing anything that presupposes it – that I’m currently sitting at a computer, that
I’m currently in Scotland, that I have a bruise on my knee etc. And yet the arguments
that led us to these two conclusions have an eerie similarity.
The argument for religious scepticism, despite appearing quite compelling at
first blush, turns out to be in rather bad company. It shares its form with an argument
for external world scepticism – an argument that we are going to have to resist in
some way or other. In the next section, I shall experiment with a certain strategy for
responding to the external world sceptical argument – one that has always struck me
as quite appealing – and examine whether it can be extended to the parallel argument
for scepticism about the existence of God.
II. AN ANTI-SCEPTICAL STRATEGY
There is a certain kind of picture according to which the significance of evidence is
always transparent in principle to careful, rational inquirers. The idea, more precisely,
is that a rational inquirer can always determine, on reflection, whether or not a body
of evidence provides genuine support for a proposition. Call this the principle of the
transparency of evidence. If this is true, then in any dispute in which the disputants
are able to agree upon a shared body of relevant evidence, they should, upon
sufficient reflection, also be able to arrive at a shared assessment of what the bearing
or significance of that evidence is. There is something very encouraging about this
picture, since it looks as though any dispute with this feature could be rationally
resolved – at least in principle.
Many disputes, however, just don’t seem to be like this – and a dispute with a
sceptic over the existence of the external world seems like a particularly striking
counterexample. Although the sceptic and I can come to agree on what the relevant
evidence is – the perceptual experiences that we have both had – we will
fundamentally disagree as to what the significance of this evidence is – as to what the
5evidence shows. He will have his interpretation of the evidence – it reflects the
spontaneous activity of the mind – and I will have mine – it reflects the interaction of
my perceptual system with external states of affairs. His interpretation of the
evidence is backed-up by his belief in a mind-dependent reality and mine is backed up
by my belief in the external world. It looks as though we are caught in a kind of circle:
We can’t settle the question of whether the external world exists without first settling
the question of how the relevant evidence is to be interpreted, but we can’t settle the
question of how the relevant evidence is to be interpreted without first settling the
question of whether the external world exists.
The dispute being imagined is not simply a dispute over some particular
matter of fact – it is a dispute over world-view. Our disagreement is so profound as to
leave us with no common ground – in particular, no common ground as to how
evidence should be evaluated. We end up with a kind of rational impasse.
All that we can say, in the end, is something like this: Provided my belief is
true – provided the external world does exist – then there is a wealth of evidence in its
favour. The sceptic, in virtue of his strange background doubts, is blinded to the force
of this evidence. Unless he relinquishes these doubts it will remain opaque to him.
My inability to persuade the sceptic is just a reflection on him and his strange
background doubts – it does not impugn my evidence or my belief. There is, of
course, another side to this: In the event that the sceptic is right – that reality is mind
dependent – then there is no evidence whatsoever for believing in the existence of the
external world. I would be the one misinterpreting the significance of perceptual
experience – and doing so, seemingly, as a result of a dogmatic background belief.
We might say that a belief in the existence of the external world ‘looks after
itself’ – if it is true, then there will be a wealth of evidence in its favour, and it will
turn out to be thoroughly justified. Believing in the existence of the external world,
then, is not a matter of faith – in one sense, the very opposite is true. Believing in the
existence of the external world commits one to regarding the belief as supported by a
torrent of evidence.
6The sceptical argument outlined in the first section traded upon the plausible-
sounding assumption that question-begging grounds could never constitute genuine
evidence in favour of a belief. We can now see, though, that the assumption is
suspect – it trades upon the principle of the transparency of evidence. Just because
the sceptic is unable to appreciate the significance of my evidence for the external
world doesn’t mean that it isn’t real evidence. The significance of evidence is not
transparent – we should not always expect an individual with bizarre background
beliefs and doubts, such as an external world sceptic, to be in a position to appreciate
it.
While it may be generally true that question-begging grounds do not constitute
genuine evidence for a belief, this will not be so for the special case of beliefs that
condition our very attitude toward evidence of certain kinds. In particular, it will not
be so for a belief in the existence of the external world. We have, then, a certain
response to the external world sceptical argument of section one and a kind of anti-
sceptical reassurance. This is not the sort of reassurance that Descartes was after of
course. If we allow ourselves to first doubt the existence of the external world, then
the assurance is no longer available to us. But it does offer reassurance to those who
are convinced that the external world exists – the justificatory status of the belief will
be ensured by the very world-view that it enshrines.
Do these considerations generalise to a belief in the existence of God? It is
easy to imagine that a dispute over the existence of God could bog down in exactly
the same way as a dispute over the existence of the external world. Both theist and
atheist can acknowledge that the theist’s religious experiences constitute relevant
evidence – it’s just that they will profoundly disagree as to what this evidence shows.
For the theist, these experiences are a direct result of God’s agency. For the atheist,
they result from wish fulfilment, insecurity, delusion etc. Once again, these divergent
interpretations of the evidence just seem to be part and parcel of the two respective
world views, in which case it is unclear how any rational progress might be made.
Could belief in the existence of God ‘look after itself’ in the same way that
belief in the existence of the external world does? While I have been talking rather
nonchalantly up to this point about ‘belief in the existence of God’, it is quite clear
7that different people can mean very different things by professing such a belief. That
is, there are many different ways of conceiving of the nature of God and His
relationship to human beings – many different kinds of religious world view. One
conception of God that is prominent in philosophical discussions is the so-called
Judaeo-Christian conception, which emphasises divine attributes such as omnipotence,
omniscience and omnibenevolence (I myself am somewhat unsure as to the extent to
which such attributes actually feature in ordinary religious convictions). In any case,
what appears to be crucial in determining whether one’s religious world view looks
after itself is whether one’s conception of God builds in sufficient details of how His
properties, attitudes, wishes, plans etc. are disclosed to believers – in the same way
that our conception of the external world builds in the idea that its features are
disclosed in perception.
It is the mere possibility of such a conception that strikes me as significant, at
least in the present context – and the possibility of augmenting or extending a
conception of God in the required manner5. Given such a conception, we have a
5 Whether actual religious convictions have this feature is an interesting question. I suspect that the
answer is yes – though I don’t intend to pursue this matter in any depth here. Prominent in John
Calvin’s influential conception of God and his relationship to humankind is the notion of a sensus
divinitatis – a kind of innate human faculty, the express purpose of which is to deliver knowledge of
God. As he writes:
There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an awareness of divinity…To
prevent anyone from taking refuge in the pretense of ignorance, God himself has implanted in
all men a certain understanding of his divine majesty…’
(Calvin, 1559, I, iii)
This might be thought to enshrine a religious world view that itself makes provision for the sound
provenance of religious beliefs.
Calvin himself takes inspiration from the following passage from Romans I:
For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and wickedness of men
who by their wickedness suppress the truth. For what can be known about God is plain to them,
because God has shown it to them. Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, his
eternal power and deity has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made. So they
are without excuse…
(Romans I: 18-20)
For further discussion of the sensus divinitatis see Plantinga (2000, partic. chap. 6).
John Henry Newman is also quite clear in regarding (Christian) religious belief as pertaining,
in part, to its own rational justification. He writes, of Christianity:
…reason [need not] come first and faith second (though this is the logical order) but one and
the same teaching is, in different aspects, both object and proof, and elicits one complex act
both of inference and assent.
(Newman, 1870, pp316)
8response to the religious-sceptical argument offered in section one and a certain kind
of anti-sceptical reassurance. Once again, though, this reassurance is limited to those
who are firm in their religious convictions – and, importantly, unavailable to those
who are already gripped by doubt over the existence of God.
This, of course, is not the only anti-sceptical strategy that we might adopt.
One very influential alternative – to which I now turn – is that canvassed by
Wittgenstein in On Certainty. The rough thought behind the Wittgensteinian
approach is something like this: Inquiry has to stop somewhere. If we are to conduct
inquiry at all, then we must be content to accept certain things without inquiring into
them. To put it slightly differently, in order for our practice of doubting and accepting
things to get off the ground, certain things – so called ‘hinge propositions’ – must be
exempt from doubt. As Wittgenstein writes:
…the questions that we raise and our doubts depend upon the fact that some propositions are
exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.
That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that some things are in deed
not doubted.
(Wittgenstein, 1969, sections 341-342)
If a proposition supports or undergirds our practice of inquiry in this way then, so the
thought continues, it can be accepted without the need for evidential support.
Believing a hinge proposition can be in epistemically good order purely in virtue of
the pivotal role that the proposition plays 6 . The Wittgensteinian rejects the
‘evidentialist’ thesis that beliefs can only be justified if they are grounded in evidence
– beliefs that play the right sort of supporting or enabling role can be exempt from this
requirement.
A belief in the existence of the external world presumably plays this kind of
role vis a vis ordinary empirical inquiry. And there is good reason to think that this
broad kind of anti-sceptical strategy could also be applied to a belief in the existence
6 This anti-sceptical strategy is sometimes supplemented by a semantic claim to the effect that hinge
propositions are not ‘fact-stating’ or don’t serve to ‘describe the world’ – a thought that is supposed to
make the prospect of accepting them without evidence more palatable. This is, roughly, the approach
pursued by Phillips (1993) and Wright (1985) and strongly suggested by some of Wittgenstein’s own
remarks (see for instance, 205, 214, 215, 308, 309). Interestingly, this kind of idea would have no
obvious role to play when it comes to the anti-sceptical strategy that I’m advocating – on the contrary,
it would seem to sit rather uneasily with it. I won’t explore this further here. For more general
discussion of the Wittgensteinian anti-sceptical strategy see Pritchard (2000) and Wright (2004).
9of God. One would simply need to make the case that such a belief plays a similar
pivotal role with respect to a practice of inquiry – namely, religious inquiry (inquiry
into God’s nature, plan etc.) (see Pritchard, 2000). For the atheist, of course, such an
inquiry will be completely misguided from the start – but then the external world
sceptic would have a similar attitude towards ordinary empirical inquiry.
My own anti-sceptical strategy has some similarities with the Wittgensteinian
approach – but some important differences as well. The Wittgensteinian holds that, if
inquiry is to get started, certain things just have to be taken on faith and, thus, it can
be epistemically appropriate to do so. And yet, as I’ve argued, it is wrong to conceive
of our belief in the existence of the external world as a matter of faith – ordinary
believers would not see it this way. If faith be understood as a self-conscious
willingness to believe in the absence of evidence, then I am unsure whether anything
needs to be accepted on faith and, further, whether it could ever be epistemically
appropriate to do so.
Given that a belief in the existence of an external world is based solely upon
grounds that would beg the question against a sceptic it is a two-step inference to the
conclusion that the belief is unjustified. From the fact that the belief is based solely
upon question begging grounds, we infer that it is not based upon genuine evidence
and from the fact that it is not based upon genuine evidence, we infer that it is not
justified. The Wittgensteinian rejects the second step – for him, the fact that a belief
is not based upon evidence does not entail that it is unjustified. I, on the other hand,
am inclined to reject the first – for me, the fact that a belief is based upon question-
begging grounds does not entail that it is not based upon evidence.
III. MAINTAINING ONE’S CONVICTIONS
What, then, has been accomplished so far? I have certainly not shown that belief in
the existence of God is justified – or even that belief in the existence of the external
world is justified. I have, though, deflected a certain kind of argument against both
claims. If the foregoing reasoning is correct, I have established something conditional:
If there is an external world then belief in the external world is justified. If there is a
God, then belief in God is justified (for a suitable conception of God). Of course,
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there is no material here to persuade or even trouble an atheist. If this conditional is
true, though, it does hold a lesson for the theist – particularly regarding the conditions
under which he might be rationally obliged to relinquish his belief. To put it slightly
differently, there are no resources here for a theist who is interested in the evangelical
project of spreading his religious beliefs to other people, but there is some reassurance
for the (perhaps less self-possessed) theist who is interested in an altogether more
personal project: reconciling his religious beliefs within his own mind, when
confronted with various kinds of criticism. In this final section I will briefly explore
the nature of this reassurance.
We can in general distinguish two different ways of criticising a belief – two
different strategies that we might adopt in trying to persuade someone to give up a
belief. The first is the direct approach – we argue that the belief in question is false.
Call this the de facto strategy. The second strategy is indirect – we argue that the
belief in question is unjustified or irrational, whilst remaining neutral on whether or
not it is true. This second approach may be particularly common as a fallback, when
debate over the truth of a belief has, for some reason, bogged down. Call this the de
jure strategy (see Plantinga, 1998, 2000, partic. the preface).
Many of the most famous – and, I think, influential critiques of belief in God
fall into the de jure category. Freud famously argued that religious belief arose
through a mechanism of wish-fulfilment – when the terrifying helplessness that besets
us as children lingers on into adulthood, according to Freud, we are inclined to seek
out a replacement for the father figure that once provided comfort and security. Marx
regarded religious belief as a kind of delusion produced in individuals by a
malfunctioning political and economic system. Nietzsche held that religious belief
originated from a kind of resentment on the part of the oppressed – and served to
reinforce and legitimate a weak, though self-righteous, character7. These criticisms
do not engage with the question of whether or not religious beliefs are true as such –
they aim to show, amongst other things, that such beliefs have a dubious and
unreliable provenance of one sort or another.
7 Freud’s views on religious belief can be found in his The Future of an Illusion and Marx’s can be
found in his On Religion (with F. Engels). Nietzsche discusses the origins of religion in On the
Genealogy of Morals, amongst other places.
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Putting these more sophisticated critiques aside, a very common, everyday
way of criticising religious believers is to allege that they lack evidence for their
convictions. It is easy to see why this kind of strategy might be attractive. It enables
us to bracket metaphysical or ontological issues and focus in upon epistemological
ones that seem at once more mundane and tractable. If the reflections of the previous
two sections are on the right track, however, then a purely de jure criticism of belief in
God is actually impossible. One cannot attack the justificatory status of belief in God,
whilst remaining neutral on its truth – for the two are intimately intertwined.
If one believes in God then one will take there to be ample evidence
supporting His existence. A belief in the existence of God, like a belief in the
existence of the external world, conditions one’s overall view of reality and one’s
view of what sort of beings we are and what kind of place in the world we occupy.
Religious belief, if true, will be justified. Thus, there is no way of arguing about the
justificatory status of religious belief while suspending the question of its truth.
For most beliefs it makes perfect sense to separate out the de facto and de jure
strategies. Suppose I’m trying to comfort a paranoid friend who is convinced that his
wife has been unfaithful. If I don’t have any direct evidence regarding her fidelity, it
would make a lot of sense for me to abandon the direct de facto strategy and opt for a
de jure strategy instead. Or suppose I am arguing with someone who believes that the
world is flat. If he is unimpressed by the evidence that I produce (he thinks satellite
photographs etc. are all faked), I might well try a different tack and opt for a de jure
strategy. This would, in effect, flip the dialectical onus – it would then be his turn to
produce putative evidence and my turn to challenge it. In both cases the de jure
strategy might well meet with greater success. But belief in the existence of God is
unusual in this respect – a feature I take it to share with belief in the existence of the
external world. In this case, the de jure strategy will end up implicating the very de
facto dispute from which we were trying to escape.
The distinction between de facto and de jure criticisms of religious belief is
discussed in detail by Alvin Plantinga (2000), who draws essentially the same
conclusion as I do: There is no such thing as a pure de jure criticism of religious belief
12
– if religious belief is true, then it will be justified. Plantinga, though, arrives at this
conclusion via a somewhat different route. One way to ensure that this conditional
holds is to tailor the consequent – to motivate a conducive analysis of epistemic
justification. This is roughly the strategy pursued by Plantinga. Another way to
ensure that this conditional holds is to tailor the antecedent – to build more content
into the religious beliefs themselves. This is roughly the strategy that I have pursued.
To put things slightly differently, Plantinga brings the justificatory status of religious
belief into conformity with its truth, while I bring the truth of religious belief into
conformity with its justificatory status. I’ve defended no specific account of
epistemic justification or evidential support and, as far as I can tell, my reasoning will
be compatible with a number of different ways of thinking about such topics.
When considering Plantinga’s view, there is one further complication worth
noting here: What Plantinga strictly argues in chapter six of Warranted Christian
Belief is that religious belief will be warranted if true. The terms ‘warrant’ and
‘justification’ are sometimes used interchangeably – but this is more than just a
terminological difference. Plantinga uses ‘warrant’ as a semi-technical term meaning
‘that quality or quantity …whatever it may be, enough of which distinguishes
knowledge from true belief’ (Plantinga, 2000, pp153). When it comes to the ordinary
notion of justification, Plantinga appears to hold that religious belief is or can be
justified, irrespective of whether it’s true – a contention of which I am somewhat
doubtful. I won’t explore Plantinga’s views any further here.
When W.K. Clifford famously proclaimed ‘it is wrong always, everywhere
and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence’, he had religious
believers squarely in his sights (Clifford, 1879). And yet, if the view I am defending
is along the right track, then religious believers have nothing to fear from Clifford’s
proclamation – religious beliefs need never exceed the authority of available evidence,
at least when evaluated from the believer’s own perspective. Religious belief would,
no doubt, exceed the authority of available evidence as Clifford is inclined to evaluate
it – but that hardly need trouble a religious believer. There are, to be sure, truths
about what provides evidence for what, about what a person’s evidence genuinely
supports etc., but they are not branded onto the minds of all rational inquirers. Our
13
predicament, at least in some cases, is that of trying to piece them together,
simultaneously with the very truths upon which they bear.
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